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Most often in the literature we would find comparisons and contrasts between Plato and 
Aristotle, stressing how much Aristotle differs from, or how much owes to Plato. The 
contemporary cultural and philosophical matrix, however, was much-much richer. 
 
As attested by a scene from a comedy of Epicrates, popular imagination had an 
unflattering view of what is going on in the Academy – much like in the case of 
Socrates’ and Chaerephon’s Phrontistērion in the Clouds of Aristophanes. But the 
stereotypes used by Aristophanes and by Epicrates are vastly different. In the Clouds 
Socrates and his associates are engaged in a travesty of research into natural 
phenomena, and sophistry. In Epicrates’ skit the school activity is much more down to 
earth: The dialogue starts with a query about Plato, Speusippus and Menedemus. In 
reply to this a story is recounted, as a flock of youngsters, in the Academy, 
during the Panathenaea 
 
in producing definitions about nature,  were busy distinguishing the sorts of 
animals’ lives,  the nature of trees, and the kinds of vegetables. 
 
And then, in the course of these, they were scrutinizing the gourd (τὴν 
κολοκύντην), what kind does it belong to. 
 
 {Β.} … περὶ γὰρ φύσεως ἀφοριζόμενοι  
 διεχώριζον ζῴων τε βίον 
 δένδρων τε φύσιν λαχάνων τε γένη.  
 
 κᾆτ᾽ ἐν τούτοις τὴν κολοκύντην  
 ἐξήταζον τίνος ἐστὶ γένους. 
 
And what did they determine? To which kind did they assign the plant? Let me 
know, if you have something to say. 
 
 {Α.} καὶ τί ποτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὡρίσαντο καὶ τίνος γένους  
 εἶναι τὸ φυτόν; δήλωσον, εἰ κάτοισθά τι.  
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At first, they all were motionless then, and speechless, and gazing down they 
were giving the issue thought for a long time. And then, suddenly, while the boys 
were still gazing down, in search of the issue, one of them declared it was a round 
vegetable; a herb – someone else said; a tree – said yet another one.  
 
 {Β.} πρώτιστα μὲν οὖν πάντες ἀναυδεῖς  
 τότ᾽ ἐπέστησαν, καὶ κύψαντες  
 χρόνον οὐκ ὀλίγον διεφρόντιζον.  
 κᾆτ᾽ ἐξαίφνης ἔτι κυπτόντων  
 καὶ ζητούντων τῶν μειρακίων  
 λάχανόν τις ἔφη στρογγύλον εἶναι,  
 ποίαν δ᾽ ἄλλος, δένδρον δ᾽ ἕτερος.  
 
The impasse is broken by a Sicilian physician, who farts in contempt at their silly talk. 
But to no avail: 
 
This did not bother the boys at all: Plato was also there, and very gently, not 
being stirred at all, set them again to defining what kind it does belong to. And 
they went on dividing. 
 
 {Β.} οὐδ᾽ ἐμέλησεν τοῖς μειρακίοις·    
 ὁ Πλάτων δὲ παρὼν καὶ μάλα πρᾴως,  
 οὐδὲν ὀρινθείς, ἐπέταξ᾽ αὐτοῖς  
 πάλιν  .  .  .  
 ἀφορίζεσθαι τίνος ἐστὶ γένους·  
 οἱ δὲ διῄρουν.  
 
 
In public imagination, then, the Academy must have been busy trying to give accounts 
of natural kinds. At least as a didactic exercise. And the conceptual framework is also 
suggested by the terms Epicrates uses: the task is to give an account about the kind of 
life (bios) different animals lead, to determine the nature (phusis) of the trees, and the 
kinds (genē) of vegetables. The starting point of such an exercise is, or at least can be 
beyond dispute: The gourd which is to be accounted for here is a plant. But within that 
quite a few different options may be open. Indeed, the boys come up with different 
suggestions. But there is hope, Plato is unstirred by vulgar criticism, and directs the 
boys back to methodical procedure, of carrying out divisions. 
 
Certainly, this last detail should be familiar to any reader of the Sophist. But this 
Epicrates text cannot guarantee that it is a faithful account of the activities of the 
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Academy, any more than the Aristophanes skit in the Clouds were such about Socrates. 
Just as Aristophanes, Epicrates too could attach to the butt of his ridicule any number of 
intellectual excesses, exaggerated at will, and taken from just about any contemporary 
intellectual strain. 
 
Consequently, we should not be taken in by the facility of supposing that Aristotle’s 
philosophy of nature, and his metaphysics must have emerged in the context of an 
Academy happily defining away natural kinds. Hence, I will pursue here a survey of the 
testimonies we have about two key contemporaries of Aristotle, to see whether either of 
them can be credited with serious inquiry into natural kinds. 
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The first to discuss is Xenocrates, the companion of Aristotle when they both left the 
Academy after Plato’s death. Xenocrates has pride of place both in Aristotle’s and 
Theophrastus’ assessment: 
 
Some people [as contrasted to Speusippus and Plato] say that forms and numbers 
have the same nature, whereas the others are consequent upon them – lines and 
planes, up until the substance of the heavens and the perceptible things. 
(Aristotle, Metaphysics 1028b24–27) 
 
ἔνιοι δὲ  τὰ μὲν εἴδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν,  τὰ δὲ 
ἄλλα ἐχόμενα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς  τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ 
τὰ αἰσθητά.  
 
 
About the heavens, and the rest they do not make a mention – similarly, the circle 
of Speusippus – neither anybody of the others, with the exception of Xenocrates. 
For he assigns everything in some way around the cosmos, perceptible things 
similarly, and intelligible ones and mathematical ones,1 and even the divine ones. 
(Theophrastus, Metaphysics 6b4–7) 
 
τοῦ δ᾽ οὐρανοῦ πέρι καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔτι ποιοῦνται μνείαν· ὡσαύτως 
δ᾽ οἱ περὶ Σπεύσιππον, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐθεὶς πλὴν Ξενοκράτης  οὗτος γὰρ 
                                                 
1 Here the kai is most probably explicative – in which case intelligible entities are identified with the mathematical 
ones.  
 4 
ἅπαντά πως περιτίθησιν περὶ τὸν κόσμον, ὁμοίως αἰσθητὰ καὶ νοητὰ καὶ 
μαθηματικὰ καὶ ἔτι δὴ τὰ θεῖα.  
 
But even though Xenocrates is unique in setting out his metaphysical account down to 
the level of perceptibles and the heavenly bodies, we have very little in terms of an 
inquiry into natural entities in their own right. This may be a coincidence of the state of 
our sources, and so of the interest of the authors reporting on Xenocrates. But there is an 
interesting further detail to consider in this instance, this time about Xenocrates’ 
epistemology. When Sextus (VII.147–148) gives a quick outline of Xenocrates’ doctrines 
about the criterion, he submits that the three ontological realms – that of perceptible 
entities, that of intelligible entities, and that of believable entities have their own, 
dedicated mode of cognition. This is still very much in a Platonic mode, of the Divided 
Line, with some crucial differences. First, that there is no distinction in the upper 
segment of the Divided Line, between mathematical cognition (dianoia) and the direct 
grasp of ideas (nous), as Forms are identical to the mathematical entities by Xenocrates’ 
lights. 
 
But there is a further change on the lower segment, too. Instead of the contrast of pistis, 
directed at perceptible objects, and eikasia, the images of these objects, we have doxa and 
perception (aisthēsis), where doxa is directed at the heavenly realm. As such, it is a 
mixture of perception – the heavenly bodies are visible – and of a science (or 
knowledge), astronomy. A further distinction from the Platonic simile is its 
epistemological optimism: The criterion of the substance beyond the heavens is science 
or knowledge (epistēmē), that of the perceptible substance is perception. Perception does 
provide truth, but not in the way that epistemonic account does. 
 
In the case of the mixed domain of the heavens we have both avenues of cognition, and 
they together provide for opinion (doxa), this can be both true and false. 
 
What may be relevant here is that the sublunary domain as such is the domain of 
perception, unaided by epistemonic accounts. Certainly this does not overrule the 
express claim that perception provides us with truths about sublunary objects, but it at 
the very least suggests restrictions on what kind of methodical acquaintance is possible 
with perceptible objects. 
 
One should nevertheless resist attributing a happy and brute perceptualism to 
Xenocrates. Not only did he write a Physics in six books (or two Physics, in six books 
each), there are some claims about the sublunary world attributed to him in our sources. 
But they do not provide us with evidence about such inquiry into natural kinds. The 
testimonies amount to Xenocrates’ doctrine of indivisible magnitudes, which surely has 
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relevance on corporeal existence. Then we have his definition of soul. Furthermore, his 
doctrine about the daimones is also one which covers entities in the sublunary realm. But 
in all these three cases perception does not play a role: indivisible magnitudes are 
indivisible because of considerations about extensions, also in the intellectual domain, 
the cognition of the soul – a self-moving number – is not the task of perception either.2 
And finally, one key feature of the daimones is that they are not present to perception as 
such. 
 
 
3 
 
We can turn now to Speusippus after Xenocrates. A less likely candidate of inquiry into 
natural kinds, as it was Xenocrates who was singled out for honourable mention for his 
reaching down to every part of the cosmos. But Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ claim will 
turn out to dispute from Speusippus much less. What both of them stress is that 
Speusippus’ account creates an episodic, unconnected cosmos. One in which the 
separate domains are not connected, or in which their connection is extremely tenuous. 
 
Apart from this, however, there is no reason to think that Speusippus’ attention would 
have excluded any domain. Granted, one Aristotelian list might mistakenly suggest that 
after a discussion of mathematical entities he provided only a discussion of the 
principles of soul, and did not reach any further: 
 
Speusippus names even more substances (i.e. more than Plato, who according to 
Aristotle named three types – forms, mathematical substances and perceptible 
ones), starting from the one, and giving principles of each substance – a different 
one for numbers, a different one for magnitudes, and then [a different one] for 
soul. This way he extends substances. (Metaphysics Z.2 1028b21–23, continuing 
with Xenocrates ) 
  
Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς 
ἑκάστης οὐσίας, ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς· καὶ 
τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας. ἔνιοι δὲ τὰ μὲν εἴδη καὶ τοὺς 
ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα, γραμμὰς καὶ 
ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά. 
 
But even though the remark might appear to contrast Speusippus and Xenocrates, that it 
was only Xenocrates who reached all the way down to perceptible entities, the claim 
                                                 
2 Indeed, Xenocrates must have taken the Timaeus as the key starting point of his psychology. 
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that Speusippus extended substances further than Plato suggests that according to 
Aristotle he also acknowledged Plato’s third type – that of perceptible substances. 
 
If we had any doubts about this, a different consideration would lead to the very same 
conclusion.  Aristotle in Metaphysics Λ mentions that Speusippus is among those 
mistaken philosophers who propose that the excellent and the best are not in the origin 
 
because the origins of plants and animals are their cause, but the excellent and the 
complete is what is developed from these (Aristotle, Metaphysics Λ.7 1072b30–34) 
 
ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος τὸ 
κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων 
τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ 
ὀρθῶς οἴονται. 
 
This, combined with the similarly damning verdict of Theophrastus suggests that this 
region of excellence is in the sublunary domain (Theophrastus, Metaphysics 11a22–25) 
  
εἰκῇ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας λέγοντες ὥσπερ Σπεύσιππος σπάνιόν τι τὸ 
τίμιον ποιεῖ τὸ περὶ τὴν τοῦ μέσου χώραν, τὰ δ᾽ ἄκρα καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν. 
 
This means that we have no reason to suppose that Speusippus’ interest would have 
excluded physical reality. 
 
For what it is worth, in a description of the articulation of mathematical principles, 
extant in the De communi mathematica scientia ch. 4, which follows the episodic structure 
of Speusippus’ account, after the level of numbers and extensions (lines, surfaces, 
solids), two further levels of reality are indicated, complete with their own elements as 
an episodic account should have it. 
 
What these levels of reality are is not indicated in this portion of the text. All we are told 
is that they are the fourth and the fifth kinds, and that they are the last ones 
 
but at the extreme, among the fourths and fifths, which are combined from the 
last elements, it is possible that deviousness comes to be, not in a principal 
fashion, but from something falling away from and failing to hold on to some 
things3 which belong to its nature (De communi mathematica scientia 4, p. 18, 9–12) 
 
                                                 
3 τινα – a plurality.. 
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 ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάτῳ δὲ ἐν τοῖς τετάρτοις καὶ πέμπτοις  
 τοῖς συντιθεμένοις ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν τελευταίων  
 κακίαν γενέσθαι οὐ προηγουμένως, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐκ-  
 πίπτειν καὶ μὴ κατακρατεῖν τινα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν.  
  
The report closes then with an explicit enumeration 
 
From these it is also clear what difference the mathematical principles have as 
contrasted to the other ones. For they precede the last principles, because whereas 
those are somehow corporeal, they [the mathematical principles] are incorporeal, 
and [they precede] the principles contemplated according to life, because whereas 
those are characterised according to motion, they are immobile, and [they 
precede] the intelligible principles, because whereas those are previously partless, 
they [the mathematical principles] provide them with the principle of 
composition and division. 
 
Let this be the determination of our general account about the mathematical 
principles, and the specific one about each one of them. How they differ from the 
other principles, let that be distinguished in this way. (De communi mathematica 
scientia 4, p. 18, 13–23) 
 
 
Ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερόν ἐστι καὶ τίνα ἔχουσι τὴν  
 διαφορὰν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἀρχαὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας· τῶν  
 μὲν γὰρ τελευταίων προέχουσι, διότι σωματικῶν πως  
 ἐκείνων οὐσῶν αὗταί εἰσιν ἀσώματοι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ  
 τὴν ζωὴν θεωρουμένων, διότι κατὰ κίνησιν ἐκείνων  
 χαρακτηριζομένων αὗταί εἰσιν ἀκίνητοι, τῶν δὲ νοη-  
 τῶν, διότι ἀμερίστων ἐκείνων προϋπαρχουσῶν αὗται  
 συνθέσεως καὶ διαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν παρέχονται. 
 
        οὕτως  
 ἡμῖν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος περὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἀρχῶν  
 καὶ ὁ ἴδιος περὶ ἑκάστων ἐχέτω διορισμόν· πῇ τε  
 διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, οὑτωσὶ διακεκρίσθω.  
Here the inclusion of intelligible principles, with their own principles is suspect. It 
seems like an attempt on the part of the author of De communi mathematica scientia at 
arriving five distinct levels of reality, not counting the initial principle, the One. If 
intelligibles were to feature in Speusippus, that would mean a reassessment of the 
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ontological status of Platonic forms, and not their exclusion in favour of the 
mathematical entities, as Aristotle reports. 
 
But otherwise the identification of the fourth and fifth realm as that of life – i.e. that of 
soul – and that of corporeality makes perfect sense, especially in view of the fact that 
these should be the levels where deviousness, as falling away from excellence should be 
present. 
 
Furthermore, this assessment is matched also by Sextus’ report on Speusippus account 
of the criterion, which Sextus gives just before his report about Xenocrates (VII.145–146). 
The crucial difference between Xenocrates and Speusippus on this score is twofold. 
First, Speusippus introduces only two kinds of criteria, one for intelligible entities, and 
another one for perceptible ones. This means that apparently he does not make a special 
epistemological pleading for astronomy. 
 
Moreover, the criterion for perceptible reality is not just perception. Rather, it is 
perception of a specific kind: cognitive perception, perception informed and imbued 
with reasoning. This kind of perception partakes of the truth which can be grasped 
through reason, but nevertheless it remains on the level of perception. The simile Sextus 
employs is that of the artful musician, whose fingers obey patterns which do not 
originate from themselves, but rather from the practice according to reasoning. 
 
The simile may in all probability go back to Speusippus. A trained musician has to be 
knowledgeable about the arithmetical structures governing harmonies, to the extent that 
he or she can follow them just out of the flow of music, without engaging in reasoning 
about them. While in the process of learning and practicing they may very well need to 
address issues of arithmetic. Once their practice and training is completed, however, 
their cognitive perception will take over, and they will be able to concentrate on the 
reality they are engaged with. 
 
Aristotle may very well demur – as he does – that Speusippus’ account does not explain 
how arithmetical knowledge can be operative in this way.4 Nevertheless, Speusippus’ 
intention is fairly clear. Just as his ontological framework is one of a descending order of 
levels of reality, where the connections between the different levels remain less than 
pellucid, his epistemological account also provides for such cognitive connections, 
through which perception is able to address and recognize cognitive contents not 
directly accessible to it. 
 
                                                 
4 See Metaphysics 1090a13–15.. 
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It remains to be seen how stringent such cognitive perception is, to what extent such 
cognitive perception is practicable and attainable. Aristotle criticises those according to 
whom in order to know anything one needs to know all the differences it may have 
from anything else – for that, however, we would need to know all the things there are. 
 
There is no need for one who is defining and dividing to know everything there 
is. Yet some say that it is impossible to know a thing’s differences from something 
without knowing that thing; but that without knowing the differences one cannot 
know that thing – for it is the same as that from which it does not differ and 
different from that from which it does differ. (Posterior analytics II.13 97a6–11 
 
 οὐδὲν δὲ δεῖ τὸν ὁριζόμενον καὶ διαιρούμενον ἅπαντα εἰδέναι τὰ ὄντα. 
καίτοι ἀδύνατόν φασί τινες εἶναι τὰς διαφορὰς εἰδέναι τὰς πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ 
εἰδότα ἕκαστον· ἄνευ δὲ τῶν διαφορῶν οὐκ εἶναι ἕκαστον εἰδέναι· οὗ γὰρ μὴ 
διαφέρει, ταὐτὸν εἶναι τούτῳ, οὗ δὲ διαφέρει, ἕτερον τούτου. 
 
 
This impossibly stringent requirement on knowing anything is ascribed to Speusippus 
by the commentators on the authority of Eudemus.5 Indeed, ascription to Speusippus is 
already a tacit relaxation of the claim. In a strictly levelled universe, with episodically 
independent domains the relevant differences should be the ones in the same 
ontological domain, even if in order to assess these one needs access to some higher 
entities, like in the case of epistemonic or cognitive perception. 
 
Nevertheless, complete coverage may be elusive even when restricted to independent 
domains. Perhaps a complete coverage of the separate branches of mathematics is 
attainable, once the necessary starting points and the valid inferential procedures are 
available.6 This, however, most probably should not be expected for perceptible entities. 
 
Hence I suggest that the not inconsiderable evidence we have of Speusippus drawing 
up divisions and establishing similarities may be something like a second sailing. The 
                                                 
5 Eudemus fr. 24 Wehrli. 
6 Here it is relevant that Speusippus does not allow for an open-ended process of constructions in 
mathematics. All there is to geometry is theorems of what there is to be grasped, see Proclus In prim. Eucl. 
77, 15–20: ἤδη δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν πάντα θεωρήματα καλεῖν ἠξίωσαν, ὡς οἱ περὶ Σπεύσιππο  
καὶ Ἀμφίνομον, ἡγούμενοι ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις οἰκειοτέραν εἶναι τὴν τῶν θεωρημάτων 
προσηγορίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν προβλημάτων, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀϊδίων ποιουμέναις τοὺς λόγους. 
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very existence of several books of similarities might in itself suggest that these are not 
just any kinds of similarities among some biological kinds (and dissimilarities, 
contrasting these kinds to some, or all the other kinds). And indeed, at least one 
testimony in Athenaeus suggests that the point of enumerating these similarities is to 
effect some kind of ordering, some kind of rudimentary taxonomy: 
 
Speusippus in Book II of Similar Things says that trumpet shells, purple shellfish, 
whelks, and conchs are very much alike. … Furthermore, Speusippus again lists 
individually in order conchs, scallops, mussels, pinnas and razor-shells, and in 
another class oysters and limpets (Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae II 86c-d, 
Speusippus fr. 8 Tarán)  
 
Σπεύσιππος δ᾽ ἐν β Ὁμοίων παραπλήσια εἶναι κήρυκας, πορφύρας, 
στραβήλους, κόγχους. […]  
ἔτι ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἑξῆς πάλιν ἰδίᾳ καταριθμεῖται κόγχους, κτένας, μῦς, 
πίννας, σωλῆνας, καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ μέρει ὄστρεα, λεπάδας.  
 
This activity of finding similarities and dissimilarities may also have included the 
tentative demarcation of larger animal kinds. Perhaps we have evidence of this in 
another passage in Athenaeus, if indeed the terminology of malakostraka goes back to 
Speusippus himself: 
 
Speusippus in Book II of Similar Things says that of the crustaceans that resemble 
one another are the crayfish, lobster, numphē, bear-crab, crab (karkinos), and 
common crab (pagouros) (Athenaeus, Deipnosohistae, 106b) 
 
Σπεύσιππος δὲ ἐν β Ὁμοίων παραπλήσιά φησιν εἶναι τῶν μαλακοστράκων 
κάραβον, ἀστακόν, νύμφην, ἄρκτον, καρκίνον, πάγουρον.  
 
Use of this terminology cannot be excluded, even though the testimony about 
Speusippus is followed closely at 106c-d by quotes of several points from Aristotle, 
Historia animalium, Book V, again about the crustaceans.7 
 
The meagre evidence we have, then, suggests considerable interest on Speusippus’ part 
in research into natural kinds. Aristotle’s silence about this then must be motivated by 
the conviction that his whole metaphysical outlook in general, and also, in particular, 
the underlying presuppositions of this enterprise are wrong-headed. Better then 
                                                 
7 These include: the way some of the crustaceans copulate (549b19–24 and b13–17), .the places some of 
these crustaceans are found (549b28),  
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someone like Xenocrates, who provides some metaphysical continuity in this enterprise, 
even if his contribution on particular detail may be not so detailed as Speusippus’. 
 
 
 
 
  
